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Abstract
In a complex processing facility, there is likelihood of occurrence of cascading scenarios, i.e. 
hydrocarbon release, fire, explosion and dispersion of combustion products. The consequence 
of such scenarios, when combined, can be more severe than their individual impact. Hence, 
actual impact can be only represented by integration of above mentioned events. A novel 
methodology is proposed to model an evolving accident scenario during an incidental release 
of LNG in a complex processing facility. The methodology is applied to a case study 
considering transitional scenarios namely spill, pool formation and evaporation of LNG, 
dispersion of natural gas, and the consequent fire, explosion and dispersion of combustion 
products using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD). Probit functions are employed to 
analyze individual impacts and a ranking method is used to combine various impacts to identify 
risk during the transitional events. The results confirmed that in a large and complex facility, 
an LNG fire can transit to a vapor cloud explosion if the necessary conditions are met, i.e. the 
flammable range, ignition source with enough energy and congestion/confinement level. 
Therefore, the integrated consequences are more severe than those associated with the 
individual ones, and need to be properly assessed. This study would provide an insight for an 
effective analysis of potential consequences of an LNG spill in any LNG processing facility 
and it can be useful for the safety measured design of process facilities.
Keywords: LNG spill, accident transition, integrated consequence, CFD
21. Introduction
LNG is considered as a safe and environmentally-friendly fuel. Safe storage, processing, 
transportation and usage are mandatory requirements for any fuel and LNG continues to reveal 
a long track record of safety in all these areas (Yeo et al., 2016). However, in a complex 
processing facility such as a floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) (Baksh et al., 2016a, b),  an 
incidental release of LNG may not simply lead to an event with only its individual impact. 
There is likelihood of escalating a minor event into more damaging events. For instance, an 
accidental release of LNG in a production facility has the potential to pose several hazards such 
as fire, explosion, brittle fracture, asphyxiation and freeze burn/frostbite. A leakage of LNG 
may be a single minor event itself. However, due to instantaneous vaporisation, it is likely to 
cause several events such as a fireball, flash fire, Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE), and pool 
fire when the vapour is ignited. Escalation of the mentioned events to a storage facility, may 
lead to Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE). The entire sequence of events 
and their interactions during an LNG spill event in an FLNG processing facility is illustrated 
in Fig. 1.
LNG 
Spill
Waves, 
obstacles, 
wind, and 
LNG 
composition
Pool 
formation
- Heat flux from  
  substrate and wind
- Wind speed,
- Rapid Phase 
  Transition
Vapour
Explosion
- Deflagration
- Detonation
May 
propagate 
back to the 
pool
Vapour 
cloud fire
- Flash fire
- Fireball
Safety
Pool 
fire
Immediate 
ignition
Embrittlement - Asphyxiation
- Freeze burn
- Frostbite
- Hypothermia
Without 
ignition
Ignition
Ignition 
within a 
confinement
Direct contact
Fig. 1. LNG spill events (adapted from Ikealumba and Wu (2014) with some modifications).
Due to the potential of having several events during an unintended LNG spill, the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) commissioned a study and recommended to 
improve the state of knowledge surrounding the potential for cascading damage to LNG vessels 
3in the case of an incidental release of LNG (US Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
2007). The study of cascading damage issues has proven difficult primarily because these 
events require the analysis of the interaction of a series of complex physical phenomena such 
as LNG flow, heat transfer, fracture and damage. Petti et al. (2013) summarized the outcomes 
of the studies on cascading damage (Figueroa et al., 2011; Petti and Kalan, 2011; Petti et al., 
2011) which explored the cryogenic and fire thermal damage to an LNG ship during a large 
LNG cargo tank breach. 
In these studies (Figueroa et al., 2011; Petti and Kalan, 2011; Petti et al., 2011), impacts 
(pressure wave, shrapnel or projectile) from the explosion are not considered in the cascading 
damage analysis. Examples of evolving accident scenarios are reported in (Ouddai et al., 2012; 
Petrie and Großbritannien, 1988). The Piper Alpha tragedy in 1988 caused 165 deaths due to 
an explosion after the release of flammable material. In the accident, leakage of gas occurred, 
and the presence of an ignition source caused multiple events such as a fireball and jet fire, 
followed by VCEs. The sequence of events led to the total loss of the platform (Pate -Cornell, 
1993). In 2004, an LNG accident occurred in the Skikda LNG plant in Algeria resulting in 27 
casualties, 56 injuries and $900 million loss. During this multiple explosions occurred due to 
excessive pressure in an adjacent boiler (Ouddai et al., 2012). The BP’s Texas City refinery 
explosion in 2005 caused 15 deaths and 180 injuries due to hydrocarbon release and subsequent 
fire and explosion (Manca and Brambilla, 2012). The release resulted in a VCE followed by a 
pool fire (Broadribb, 2006). In 2010, the Macondo accident in the Gulf of Mexico occurred 
with a series of events such as blowout, dispersion of released hydrocarbons, explosion and 
fire (Deepwater Horizon Study Group (DHSG), 2011). The flame propagating from the 
explosion reached the flammable vapour dispersed over the platform and led to the fire at the 
source of release at the drilling floor. Major accidents that occurred in process facilities are 
well explained in (Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011; Al-shanini et al., 2014; Khan and Abbasi, 
1999). These accidents are mainly associated with fires, explosions and toxic product release. 
Most past studies regarding fire and explosion accidents were limited to individual fires or 
explosions or combustion products modelling and did not address evolving accident scenarios 
(Dadashzadeh et al., 2013a; Dadashzadeh et al., 2014; Gavelli et al., 2011; Kim and Salvesen, 
2002). For instance, Dadashzadeh et al. (2013a) modelled the dispersion of flammable gas 
integrated with explosion consequences of the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion using a Flame 
Acceleration Simulator (FLACS). Smoke and heat radiation released from the fire also affect 
human health and offshore structures; however, this impact was not addressed in the 
consequence analysis. Dadashzadeh et al. (2014) proposed a methodology for toxicity risk 
4assessment during an LNG fire and revealed that high risks are found at the process facility 
due to higher concentrations of combustion products and longer exposure time. However, the 
direct consequence of fire was not considered. Baalisampang et al. (2017a) and Baalisampang 
et al. (2017b) modelled the impact of a fire in a typical FLNG processing facility. Other 
potential events, their interactions, and consequences were not included by Baalisampang et al. 
(2017a).  Kim and Salvesen (2002) conducted a study on LNG vapour release, which was 
addressed as a possible VCE. However, a potential fire scenario was not considered. Another 
study by Koo et al. (2009) focused on pool fire modelling only and no consideration was given 
to a VCE or other possible interactions such as a jet fire. But in most cases, fire, explosion and 
combustion product release occur one after another or simultaneously resulting in integrated 
consequences (Baalisampang et al., 2018a; Baalisampang et al., 2018b). Reviews of past 
accidents (Al-shanini et al., 2014; Dadashzadeh et al., 2013a; Manca and Brambilla, 2012) and 
models (Al-shanini et al., 2014; Baksh et al., 2015; Kim and Salvesen, 2002; Koo et al., 2009) 
demonstrate a need to evaluate the entire accident sequence to mitigate the impact, to develop 
appropriate response methods and to prevent accidents by designing safety measures in the 
system. Combination of various accidental events is important as one event may lead to another 
and increases the overall consequences. To model entire impacts of a potential accident in a 
complex processing facility, it is essential to consider transitional event scenarios because in 
such modelling, entire causes and effects of a series of events are considered. In comparison to 
onshore processing facilities, offshore facilities are deemed more vulnerable to transitional 
events due to limited topside space and harsh environmental conditions (Baalisampang et al., 
2016). Some offshore accidents involving transitional events are given in Table 1. 
Table 1
Offshore fire and explosion accidents associated with multiple events
Accident name, year 
and geographical 
region
Event sequence Consequences References
Piper Alpha, 1988,
Europe North Sea
Release          Explosion
         Fire
165 fatalities, total 
loss
(Pate -
Cornell, 
1993)
High Island Pipeline,
1989, US GOM
Collision         Release       
Explosion          Fire
11 fatalities, 4 injuries 
and significant 
damage
(OPG, 
2010b)
Enchova Central, 1984,
America South East
Blowout         Fire          
Explosion
42 Fatalities, 19 
injuries and 
significant damages
(OPG, 
2010b)
5Lake Maracaibo, 1993,
America South East
Explosion         Fire 11 fatalities, 
significant damage
(OPG, 
2010b)
Ubit, 1995,
Africa West
Explosion          Fire
10 fatalities, 23 
injuries and severe 
damage
(OPG, 
2010b)
Petrobras P-36, 2001,
America South East
Explosion         Fire      
Capsizing 
11 fatalities, total loss (OPG, 2010b)
Bombay High North, 
2005, Asia South
Collision         Release          
Fire
12 fatalities, severe 
damage to the jacket
(OPG, 
2010b)
Deepwater Horizon, 
2010, GOM
Blowout          Release         
Fire          Explosion
11 people died, 17 
injuries and total loss
(Deepwater 
Horizon 
Study Group 
(DHSG), 
2011)
Black Elk, 2012,
GOM
Release          Fire       
Explosion
3 people died, 
pollutant spill
(BSEE, 
2013)
SOKAR platform, 
2014,
Caspian Sea
Explosion          Fire 12 people fell into the 
sea
(Fattakhova 
and 
Barakhnina, 
2015)
Abkatun Alfa platform,
2015, GOM
Explosion          Fire 7 people died, 45 
injuries
(Offshore 
Post-
Everything 
offshore 
energy, 
2015)
In fire and explosion accidents, a combined impact assessment is assumed to provide a 
more accurate consequence than individual one. In fire and explosion accidents, a damage 
potential (radius) can be increased if the impact of combustion products is considered 
(Dadashzadeh et al., 2014). During fire and explosion accidents, depending upon the types of 
burning materials and their combustion products, people are exposed to adverse health effects. 
For an integrated impact study, Khan and Amyotte (2004) proposed a methodology that 
incorporated fire, explosion and toxic release damage indices to evaluate the inherent safety of 
a facility based on inherent safety guidelines. Dadashzadeh et al. (2013b) proposed a new 
methodology for modelling an integrated consequence of fire and explosion using the Fire 
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) and FLACS and concluded that the risk of combined consequences 
is higher than each individual risk. But potential risk from combustion products during fire 
and/or explosion was not considered in the study. Niazi et al. (2018) proposed an integrated 
consequence modelling approach for fire and combustion products using risk based and grid-
6based approaches and claimed that the risk posed by thermal radiation is confined only to the 
lower deck. But the risk of exposure to combustion products was presentfound in the a larger 
areaportion than that of the radiation, due to under the influence of wind. Unlike previous 
studies (Dadashzadeh et al., 2013b; Khan and Amyotte, 2004; Niazi et al., 2018), the current 
study proposes a risk-based approach to model an integrated impact of fire, explosion and 
combustion products during an accidental release of LNG in a typical FLNG processing facility.
2. Methodology
This study proposes a methodology that models an integrated impact of evolving accident 
scenarios such as release, pool fire, explosion events and dispersion of combustion products as 
illustrated in Fig. 2. Currently, several Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) softwares tools 
such as IMESAFR (Tatom et al., 2011), Riskcurves (GexCon, 2018b), EFFECTS (GexCon, 
2018a), Riskan (Lewis, 2005), HAMS-GPS (HAMSAGARS) and Phast and Safeti (DNV-GL, 
2018) are available for accident modelling. They are simpler and faster than most CFD tools. 
A majority of QRA software tools lacks the capability of considering complex effects of 
geometry and equipment in the simulation and cannot model evolving accident scenarios. But 
thise studycurrent approach considers the effect of complex geometry and/or equipment and 
models cascading events and their impacts using the following five steps.
In step 1, LNG release scenario, pool formation, vaporisation and dispersion of LNG 
vapour are modelled using FLACS. These phenomena are simulated with careful consideration 
of plausible scenarios. 
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Fig. 2. Proposed methodology for modelling an integrated impact of transitional events to 
human during an LNG spill.
In step 2, the potential transitional phenomena are considered by attending to a series 
of events such as dispersion of LNG vapour, pool fire and VCE. In this transitional event, tThe 
phenomenological changes to spilled LNG and vaporisation due to a culmination of 
atmospheric effects and thermal radiation are considered for assessing the occurrence of 
potential cascadingtransitional events. The thermal load obtained from the pool fire is used as 
the source of ignition for the VCE. For transitional events to occur, some minimum conditions 
need to be fulfilled. For instance, a dispersion event can transit to pool fire only if the 
flammability condition is met. Similarly, an VCE occurs when pertinent conditions such as 
confinement, turbulence, ignition source, and flammable gas cloud are present (Atkinson et al., 
2017; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1996). These pertinent conditions are considered as 
stimuli for the transitions (events) (Alzbutas, 2015). Turbulence is required for the flame front 
8to accelerate to the speeds required for a VCE which is typically formed by the interaction 
between the flame front and obstacles (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1996). General 
conditions required to cause a particular event are considered as stimuli for the transitions 
(events) (Alzbutas, 2015). During a release, with the vaporisation and dispersion of LNG in 
air, only a vapour concentration in the range of 5-15 vol.% will sustain the propagation of a 
flame upon ignition. The concentration of the vapour above the upper explosion limit may act 
as feed gas to the fire. The remaining vapour concentration may act as feed gas to the fire. 
However, if the dispersed vapours concentration accumulateoutside this range builds 
overpressure in nearby semi-confined or confined areas, the fire may transform to an VCE 
upon ignition. This may increase the severity of consequence in total. If the flammable gas 
release is not ignited immediately, a vapor plume will form which will drift and disperse by 
the ambient winds and/or natural ventilation. If the vapour is ignited, but does not explode, it 
will result in a flash fire, in which the gas cloud within the flammable range burns very rapidly. 
If the vapour is not isolated during this time, the flash fire may burn to yield a jet fire at the 
source of the release, under the condition that the concentration range is appropriate, and the 
leak is present. 
In step 3, the heat released from the pool fire is modelled as the potential ignition source 
to ignite the flammable gas accumulated at a position away from the pool fire location such 
that the fire did not consume the rich vapour cloud from this location. It was assumed that this 
location did not get direct fire flame and the presence of high thermal radiation from the fire 
resulted in an autoignition of the vapour or influenced other ignition sources to ignite. During 
a release of a flammable gas, if the ignition is delayed by 5-10 min, a VCE may be the outcome 
(Assael and Kakosimos, 2010; Soman and Sundararaj, 2012). For ignition to take place, the 
vapour cloud must be within the flammable range, while at the same time a source able to 
supply the required energy must be available (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010). To model a pool 
fire transiting to a VCE, thermal radiation and other parameters such as temperature and 
pressure development are extracted from the previous step. There are various models available 
for gas explosion modelling, like empirical, phenomenological and CFD (Lea and Ledin, 2002). 
According to Tam and Lee (1998), CFD codes are inherently more flexible than both empirical 
and phenomenological models and are applicable to all fields. Some commonly used CFD 
models for explosion simulations are EXSIM, FLACS and AutoReaGas (Lea and Ledin, 2002). 
FLACS developed by the Global Explosion Consultants (GexCon AS) has been used widely 
for the modelling of gas dispersion and explosion in onshore or offshore facilities (Hansen et 
al., 2005). In this study, FLACS is used to model the fire and explosion scenarios. 
9In step 4, the consequences of fire, explosion and/or combustion product release are 
analysed individually using probit functions. The heat load obtained from the fire is used to 
assess the fire impact to assets and people. The probability of human impacts from the heat 
radiation is calculated by Eq. (2), considering the probit model given in Eq. (1).
Probit function (Pr) = c1 + c2ln D,                           (1) 
The probability of injury or death ,                          (2)  (𝑃) = 𝐹𝑘12[1 + 𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝑃𝑟 ‒ 52 )]
where D is the thermal dose , c1 and c2 are probit coefficients, Fk is a clothes correction (𝑘𝑊𝑚2 )43𝑠
factor, and erf is the error function. The thermal dose is obtained from the post processing file 
using inbuilt utilities in FLACS.
Sudden large changes in pressure due to an explosion can lead to dramatic and possibly fatal 
damage to vital human organs such as lungs and ears. The impact of explosion is assessed 
based on the calculation of the probability (P) of injury or death employing Eqs. (3)-(8).
Probit function (Pr) = c1 + c2ln S,                           (3) 
The probability of injury or death (P)                                       (4)  = 12[1 + 𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝑃𝑟 ‒ 52 )],
where variable S is defined according to the type of the effect calculated by S =  ), (4.2𝑃 + 1.3𝑖
where is the scaled impulse , is scaled pressure (-) and c1 and c2 are probit 𝑖 (𝑃𝑎12.𝑠.𝑘𝑔 ‒ 13) 𝑃 
coefficients (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010). Explosion effects on humans are usually 
categorised as:
1. Direct or primary effects
The overpressure from the explosion can cause injury to sensitive human organs, or 
death.
2. Indirect effects
The indirect effects are sub-divided into two categories
a. Secondary effects refer to injuries or death caused by fragments or debris thrown 
by explosion's blast, 
b. Tertiary effects that refer to injuries or death caused by whole-body displacement 
and collision with stationary objects or structures, because of the explosion's blast 
waves.
10
The probabilities of impact to lung, eardrum rupture, head impact and whole-body 
displacement impact are calculated using Eq. (4). However, the Pr are different. In this study, 
the following probit functions are used for each type of impact (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010).
For lung damage, (5)𝑃𝑟 = 5 ‒ 5.74 ln𝑆
For eardrum damage, (6)𝑃𝑟 =‒ 12.6 + 1.524 ln𝑃𝑠
For head impact, (7)𝑃𝑟 = 5 ‒ 8.49 ln𝑆
For whole-body displacement, (8)𝑃𝑟 = 5 ‒ 2.44ln𝑆
where Ps is overpressure (Pa). According to Clancey (1972) cited in Crowl and Louvar (2011) 
1-99% fatalities can occur when exposed to over 2 bar.
Toxicity of combustion products accounts for a major cause of death and injury from 
unwanted fires (Hartzell, 1992). The main combustion products are divided into two types: 
asphyxiant gases, which prevent oxygen uptake by cells, leading to loss of consciousness and 
death; irritant gases which cause immediate incapacitation affecting eyes and upper respiratory 
tract long-term damage in the lung (Hull and Stec, 2010). Because of these harmful effects, 
they can seriously jeopardise evacuation. During an LNG fire or VCE, carbon monoxide (CO) 
and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) are the main toxic combustion products (Dadashzadeh et al., 2014).
In the step 5, the integrated impact of fire, explosion and combustion product release is 
estimated. For integration of fire and VCE effects a grid-based approach is used such that 
consequence severity can be mapped as an index. To estimate risk of each event, a risk-based 
approach was further adopted using a severity index and probability of each effect. The severity 
index for each type of effect (Si) is estimated using expert judgment. The effects are ranked 
based on their severity of damages (Table 2) and experts' judgment on a scale of 1–10. 
Table 2
Severity scores for human effects caused by fire and explosion  (Dadashzadeh et al., 2013b)
Fire Explosion
Effects First 
degree 
burn
Second 
degree 
burn
Death Lung 
damage
Eardrum 
rupture 
(injury)
Head 
impact 
(death)
Whole body 
displacement 
(death)
Score (S) 2 5 10 10 5 10 10
The severity index for each effect at any location of the plant is calculated as follows:
Riski = Si × Pi,              (9)
Where, Riski denotes the severity index for each effect and i denotes the effects (first degree 
injury, second degree injury and death for fire; lung damage, eardrum rupture, head impact and 
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whole-body displacement for explosion). At each grid point, the maximum severity index 
among the various effects of each accident is considered using Eqs. (10) and (11) for a fire and 
explosion respectively. 
Riskf = maximum [Risk First degree burn, Risk Second degree burn, Risk Death]                          (10)
Riske = maximum [Risk Lung, Risk Eardrum damage, Risk Head impact, Risk Whole body displacement]            (11)
The total risk of fire and VCE (Riskfe) at any location is estimated using Eq. (12),
Riskfe = Riskf + Riske               (12)
Using the Riskfe at any location of the layout, risk contour can be obtained considering 
cumulative effects of a fire and VCE.
The toxicity risk assessment is carried out according to the methodology proposed by 
Dadashzadeh et al. (2014). A hazard index (HI) was estimated at each grid point of the layout 
using Eq. (13) (National Research Council, 1998).
(13)𝐻𝐼 = 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑚𝑔/𝑚3)𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑚𝑔/𝑚3)
For toxic risk estimation of each contaminant of the combustion product, Eq. (13) can be 
written as in Eq. (14). 
Riskcombustion product =                                (14)
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝐿𝑉 ‒ 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐿
Where TLV-STEL is the Threshold limit value - Short Term Exposure Limit (mg/m3). By 
adding the hazard quotients (hazard indices) for the individual emission toxicants, the hazard 
quotient of all toxicants is obtained as shown in Eq. (15). A risk of a health effect is assumed 
to exist at those exposure locations where the hazard index exceeds 1.
(15)𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐶𝑂 + 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑁𝑂2
Finally, the integrated risk at any location of the facility is estimated by investigating the Riskfe 
and the Riskcombustion products under any considered scenarios.
3. Application of the integrated methodology: a case study 
The proposed methodology is applied to a typical layout consisting of several process 
equipment as shown in Fig. 3. Leak, vaporisation and dispersion are strongly dependent on the 
operating parameters and may need to consider prevalent operating conditions. In this case 
study, prevalent operating conditions are considered based on FLACS user’s manual (GexCon 
AS, 2013). In this scenario, 10 kg/s of LNG is released at an LNG processing plant. According 
to Woodward (2010) the appropriate wind speed for flammable cloud dispersion is usually 
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close to 2 to 4 m/s and thus, the wind speed is taken as 3 m/s with an ambient temperature of 
20°C. A pool of LNG is formed at the release location and vaporization occurs due to the 
ambient conditions. The vaporized LNG is then dispersed by the wind and a fuel vapour cloud 
is formed in the process area. At 125 s, an ignition occurs in the process area which leads to a 
pool fire. After 55 s the fire transits to a VCE in the congested and confined portion of the 
facility. This time is chosen based on the presence of the maximum thermal radiation in the 
layout. The heat load released due to the fire enhances the LNG vaporization over the LNG 
pool and causes a VCE. A transitional scenario is developed considering the inherent 
characteristics of the LNG spill and various potential events (such as pool formation, spreading, 
vaporization, and vapour dispersion) are modelled.
Fig. 3. A layout chosen for the transitional events modelling
 3.1. Release, pool formation, vaporisation and dispersion modelling
In this scenario, an instantaneous release of LNG is considered which led to a pool 
formation and formed a flammable vapour plume upon vaporisation. A pool fire is considered 
with a delayed ignition. The entire layout 85 m × 55 m × 20 m is considered for simulation 
with a grid resolution of 0.4 m for the x and y directions and 0.3 m in the z direction. A 
sensitivity analysis was performed using volumetric concentration to select the grid size for a 
solution independent of the mesh size. Around the leak location, the grid resolution was 
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adjusted to 0.2 m while at the locations far from the pool area, grids were stretched according 
to grid refinement guideline given in GexCon AS (2013). The LNG was assumed to be 
composed of 85% methane, 10% ethane and 5% propane. According to Pitblado et al. (2005) 
the maximum credible puncture hole is 250 mm. Thus, a point leak is considered from a 0.05 
m2 hole for 120 s forming a pool. A dynamic pool model (PM3) is chosen which means that 
the pool spreads with non-uniform pool temperature due to the influence of heat and mass 
transfer in each control volume (GexCon AS, 2013). A constant evaporation rate of 0.14 
kg/(m2s) is considered based on the OPG (2010a). The considered leak parameters are given in 
Table 3.
Table 3
Leak parameters considered in the release scenario
Leak type Jet
Leak position (26.5, 20, 1.2) m
Leak direction +X
Start time 5 s
Duration 120 s
Outlet
a. Area
b. Mass flow rate
c. Relative turbulence intensity
d. Turbulence length scale
e. Temperature
0.05 m2
10 kg/s
0.02 (Low)
0.025 m
-160°C
The initial and boundary conditions assigned for the simulation are provided in Table 4 and 
Table 5 respectively. The Euler boundary condition is a zero pressure condition and demands 
significant distance in all directions (GexCon AS, 2013).
Table 4 
Initial conditions used
Parameters Values
Characteristic velocity 0.1 m/s
Relative turbulence intensity 0.1
Turbulence length scale 0.01 m
Temperature 20 °C
14
Ambient pressure 100 kPa
Ground roughness 0.001 m
Reference height 2 m
Pasquill stability class F
Table 5 
Boundary conditions
Name Type
XLO Wind
XHI Euler
YLO Wind
YHI Euler
ZLO Euler
ZHI Euler
All parameters required for post processing are given in Table 6.
Table 6
 A list of simulated parameters
Output parameters Unit 
Pressure (P) barg
Maximum pressure (PMAX) barg
Velocity vector (VVEC) m/s
Combustion product mass fraction (PROD) -
Temperature (T) K
Mass fraction of carbon monoxide (CO) -
Radiative heat flux (QRAD) kW/m2
Total heat flux (Q) kW/m2
Mass fraction of soot (SOOT) -
Heat dose (QDOSE) ((kW/m2)^(4/3)s)
15
Mass fraction of Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) -
Probability of death (PDEATH) -
Toxic probit (PROBIT) -
Toxic concentration (TCONS) mg/m3
Toxic dose (TDOSE) mg/m3.minute
The vaporised fuel concentrations in the layout are monitored during the dispersion as shown 
in Figs. 4 and 5. The presence of flammable concentrations (0.05 - 0.15) indicates that the fuel 
has the potential to be ignited in several areas of the layout. This would likely contribute to the 
occurrence of transitional events or evolving accident scenarios.
Fig. 4. Dispersion of vaporised LNG over the layout (m3/m3) at time 125 s
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Fig. 5. 3D dispersion of fuel in the layout (m3/m3) at 125 s which shows the maximum volume 
of gas cloud.
3.2. Assessing the possibility of transitional features
A VCE is considered as the final event and to identify transitional features, fire 
modelling is considered. Based on the dispersion characteristics of the LNG vapour, a pool fire 
is modelled with a delayed ignition 125 s using the FLACS fire model as demonstrated in Fig. 
6. In the fire simulation, the Discrete Transfer Method (DTM) model is used because this is the 
most accurate radiation model (GexCon AS, 2013). Emissivity of 0.85 is used because it is 
applicable to most steel surfaces. To provide numerical stability, radiation start ramp is 
considered to be 1 (GexCon AS, 2013). The Eddy Dissipation Concept (EDC) is chosen as the 
combustion model. The Formation Oxidation model is chosen as the soot model. For typical 
hydrocarbons, the soot yield is in the order of 1% (GexCon AS, 2013). Radiation, smoke and 
engulfment are the main hazards of a pool fire (Jagger and O’Sullivan, 2004). The possibility 
of ignition of the accumulated LNG vapour due to the thermal radiation release from the fire 
needs to be assessed for transitioning to a VCE.
17
Fig. 6. 3D pool fire model at 125 s
The main purpose of the transitional event modelling is to analyse if the fire or dispersed 
vapour can cause a VCE or flash fire in the presence of an existing fire. The most likely location 
of an VCE can be identified based on the presence of a flammable concentration of LNG vapour, 
confinement/equipment congestion and ignition source. An autoignition can be a source of 
ignition of the vapour or heated objects due to the thermal radiation from the fire (Planas-Cuchi 
et al., 1997; Zheng and Chen, 2011). According to the fuel concentration and its developed 
pressure during LNG vapour dispersion, a transition of the pool fire to a VCE is modelled. The 
transition from fire to VCE is considered after 55 s of the start of the fire, that is at 180 s. The 
small pressure developed during LNG vapour dispersion is demonstrated in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. Pressure developed in in the layout during dispersion of the fuel (barg)
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3.3. Toxic potency assessment of combustion products
During LNG (mainly methane) fire, CO, Carbon dioxide, NO2, unburnt methane and water are 
produced as combustion products depending on complete or incomplete combustion reaction. 
In this study, only CO and NO2 are considered for toxic potency assessment owing to their high 
toxicity According to (Dadashzadeh et al., 2014). CO and NO2 are considered as the main 
combustion products of LNG fire. Thus, CO and NO2 are used for toxic potency assessment in 
this study. The different symptoms and health effects of CO and NO2 are found in Purser et al. 
(2015) and the National Research Council (1998) respectively.As shown in Table 7, the 
concentration levels of CO can have different health effects.
Table 7
Health effects at different concentrations of CO (Purser et al., 2015)
CO in 
air/ppm
CO in 
air/ 
(mg/m3)
Inspired 
/%
Carboxyhemoglobin 
(COHb) by ranges 
(approx.)
Toxic effects
1 1.15 0.0001 0 None. COHb normal range
3 3.44 1-1.5%. Note that inhaled CO 
adds to the baseline value
9 10.31 2 Vasodilation, slight reduction in 
time to exhaustion, possibly minor 
central nervous system effects
10 11.46 0.001
30 34.37 5
50 57.28 Reduced performance of complex 
tasks
70 80.19 10
90 103.1 Headache, nausea, impaired 
judgement, lethargy, dizziness, 
shortness of breath (not marked 
early on)
100 114.56 0.01 20
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300 343.68 Severe headache, vomiting, 
confusion. Collapse. Death may 
occur
700 801.92 50 Fits
900 1031.04 Coma, weak pulse, slow breathing
1000 1145.60 0.1 Death
3000 3436.81 80 Rapidly fatal
10000 1
100000 10
The different health effects of NO2 concentrations are illustrated in Table 8.
Table 8
Health effects of NO2 at 30 minutes exposure (National Research Council, 1998)
 
3.4. Integration of impact analysis
In this current study, an integrated impact analysis is conducted according to the step 5 of the 
methodology. The risks severity of combustion products was not directly normalised with those 
of thermal radiation and overpressure. However, an integrated impact analysis is conducted by 
investigating the risk contours of fire, VCE and combustion products. Similar to Dadashzadeh 
et al. (2013b), an integrated risk contour is used for assessing the impact of transitional accident 
scenarios in the facility. 
4.Results and discussion
4.1. Results for transition modelling
The released LNG dispersed in the air resulted in a flammable vapour concentration 
over the plant not only adjacent to the leak location but also away from it. The autoignition 
temperature of LNG (primarily methane) is 1004ᵒF (813.15K) (Foss et al., 2003). High 
temperatures and radiation from the fire reach the congested/confined areas, indicating that 
during the fire, there is a possibility of transitioning the fire into a VCE. The range of radiation 
and temperature generated during the fire are given in Figs. 8 and 9 respectively. 
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Fig. 8. Temperature distribution over the layout during the pool fire (K) at 180 s
The maximum temperatures and thermal radiation are 2300K and 80 kW/m2 
respectively. These high temperature and thermal radiation may easily contribute in causing 
other fires in adjacent areas. The variation of air pressure in the layout in the presence of the 
dispersed vapour can be a useful information for assessing the potential location of a VCE. 
During gases dispersion, concentration in the air can create different initial pressure, which is 
one of the parameters on which the strength of explosion depends (Kundu et al., 2016). In this 
study, the maximum pressure developed during the dispersion of LNG vapour is 0.001 barg 
(illustrated in Fig. 7). The 1 mbar initial pressure may not have a substantial effect on the 
strength of a VCE. The pressure developed during the dispersion of LNG vapour is 0.001 barg 
(illustrated in Fig. 7).The maximum pressure developed during the dispersion of the LNG 
vapour is about 0.001 barg as illustrated in Fig. 7. The output results obtained from the fire 
modelling and the dispersion modelling show that the transition to a VCE or a flash fire is 
possible.
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Fig. 9. Radiation from the fire over the layout (kW/m2) at 180 s
4.2.  Thermal radiation impact
The tenability limit for human beings is approximately 2.5 kW/m2 (Mannan, 2012). The 
presence of thermal radiation greater than 2.5 kW/m2 indicates that the fire can have serious 
effects to human and adjacent assets. The probability of injuries (first and second-degree burn) 
and the probability of death at different location of the plant are calculated using the thermal 
radiation. The maximum damage distance for various effects of fire is given in Table 7. 
Table 7
Maximum damage distance for various effects of fire
Effects on humans Heat flux (kW/m2) Maximum damage 
distance (m)
100% lethality in 1 min.
1% lethality in 10 s
37.5 26.2
100% lethality in 1 min.  Serious 
injuries in 10 s
25 33.5
1% lethality in 1 min.
First degree burns in 10 s
12 36.7
No lethality.
2nd degree burns probable.
4 39.8
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Pain after exposure of 20 s.
Acceptable limit for prolonged 
exposure
1.6 43.5
The fire risk index of all grid points was calculated and plotted over the layout as demonstrated 
in Fig. 10. The risk index (Riskfe) varies from 1 to the maximum value of 10 at the flame surface.
Fig. 10. Fire risk contour in the layout at 180 s
4.3.  VCE impact and risk assessment
The impact of the VCE and its subsequent risk are assessed based on the overpressure 
developed during the VCE. The explosion overpressure ranges from 0 to 2 barg over the layout 
and high pressures are found in the areas with a high congestion/confinement level as shown 
in Fig. 11. The developed pressures are limited within a portion of the congested layout. 
However, the developed pressures can result in damages to assets and humans in those areas 
of the facility. The damage distance from the VCE ignition point is illustrated in Table 8.
Table 8 
Damage distance from the VCE ignition point
Effects Distance from the 
ignition point (m)
100% fatality 4.60 
60% fatality 6.25
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Fatal distance limit 7.80
Eardrum damage limit 10.30
Safe distance 15 
Fig. 11. VCE pressure over the plant (barg) at 180 s
Using the probit model, the probabilities of injuries or death caused by the overpressure 
were estimated. Subsequently, the VCE risk index (Riske) was calculated and plotted over the 
facility as shown in Fig. 12. The values of the VCE risk index vary from 1 to 10. Index 1 
corresponds to very low risk and the index 10 shows the maximum risk. A high-risk index is 
found in the congested/confined areas and vice-versa. 
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Fig. 12. Explosion risk profile at 180 s
4.4.  Combustion product impact
The toxic concentration (mg/m3) data obtained from the fire and explosion simulations were 
used for the toxicity assessment.  The concentrations of contaminants are high near the fire and 
explosion locations and confined areas. The toxic concentration of NO2 is given in Fig. 13. In 
confined areas, the concentration of NO2 is more than 105 mg/m3. Carbon monoxide is very 
toxic and a concentration of 1.28% leads to death within 2-3 minutes (Struttmann et al., 1998). 
The toxic concentration of CO is illustrated in Fig. 14. The higher concentrations of NO2 are 
present in larger areas of the layout than those of CO. The obtained NO2 and CO values are 
relatively high because these concentrations were measured when there was ongoing fire. Risk 
values are high around the fire and VCE locations due to higher concentrations of contaminants. 
This is because a risk value directly depends on exposure duration and concentration. 
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Fig. 13. Concentration of NO2 over the layout (mg/m3) at 180 s
Fig. 14. Toxic concentration of CO (mg/m3) at 180 s
4.5.  Integrated impact during transition of fire to VCE
In most fire and/or explosion events, injury or fatality can be caused by combustion 
products in addition to radiation or overpressure hazards. Fig. 15 demonstrates the integrated 
risk contours in the layout because of thermal radiation and overpressure during the fire and 
VCE. For simplicity, the range of risk index is normalised between 1 and 10 in the integrated 
risk profile. High risk indices are available in the fire location and the VCE area due to the 
inherent nature of those events. 
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Fig. 15. Integrated risk profile of the fire and the VCE at 180 s
In toxicity risk assessment, an integrated risk of both contaminants is considered as 
shown in Fig. 16. The total combustion product risk shows that significant portions of the 
facility exceed the acceptable level of risk which is 1. The integrated risk profile of 
contaminants indicates that the high-risk area is larger than that of the integrated impact of fire 
and VCE as seen in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. However, due to the short exposure duration, the 
severity of the combustion products is lower than that of thermal radiation and overpressure. 
This shows that the impact of transitional events such as fire and VCE along with combustion 
products is more severe than an individual phenomenon because more portions of the facility 
exceeded the acceptable level of risk.
The current approach incorporates an additional feature to the previous integrated 
consequence studies such as Khan and Amyotte (2004) and Dadashzadeh et al. (2013b).  Khan 
and Amyotte (2004) incorporated fire, explosion and toxic release damage indices, but did not 
directly assess the consequence. The adopted technique in Khan and Amyotte (2004) cannot 
be useful for visualizing the area directly affected by fire, explosion and combustion products. 
The severity of consequence would have been different if the impact of the combustion product 
was considered by Dadashzadeh et al. (2013b). During a fire and/or explosion, the potential 
risk from combustion products can be too simple to ignore because toxicity has been a major 
cause of death and injury from fires (Hartzell, 1992).
 This paper illustrated only a specific case study. However, any changes in operating 
conditions such as wind speed, wind direction, snow, rain or other parameters can be 
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incorporated in this approach. Therefore, a range of scenarios can be envisaged and evaluated 
accordingly.
Fig. 16. Integrated risk of combustion products at 180 s
5. Conclusions
In Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) processing facilities, there is a possibility of a fire 
transitioning into a Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) or vice-versa during an accidental release 
of hydrocarbons as demonstrated in various past fire and explosion accidents. Identification of 
potential location of transitional events is useful for understanding the occurrence of cascading 
accident scenarios. A framework has been proposed for modelling transitional events (fire, 
VCE and combustion product release) and their integrated consequences using Computational 
Fluid Dynamics (CFD). The proposed framework was applied to a case study considering an 
accidental LNG release, including vaporisation, a pool fire and a VCE. The impact of each 
individual event was assessed, and an integrated consequence was modelled using a risk-based 
approach. The severity of risk during each event in the layout was compared. By analysing the 
LNG spill, vaporisation, dispersion and subsequent fire in the layout, it is foreseeable that a 
pool fire can transit to a VCE because of the availability of required suitable conditions such 
as a flammable vapour concentration, ignition source and congestion/confinement. The risk of 
the overpressure was limited to confined spaces and was insignificant in other areas. The risk 
of thermal radiation was present in a larger area in comparison to the VCE. The risk of 
combustion products was present in a larger area than those of radiation and the overpressure, 
28
but its severity was lower due to the short exposure duration. It was found that the integrated 
risk of transitional events was higher than that of the individual risk. 
A cChanges in weather conditions and source terms may affect the outcome of an 
analysis related to gas leak and dispersion. Responses to gas leak and its dispersion are strongly 
dependent on these parameters and one set of parameters may not represent all cases. For 
illustration purpose, this study has presented only a specific case. Once operating conditions 
such as wind speed, wind direction, snow, rain or other parameter changes, the response need 
to be evaluated accordingly. The current study serves to highlight the importance of transitional 
events modelling and expands the scope of the integrated consequence modelling approach. 
Despite having complex correlations among various parameters involved in LNG spill and 
subsequent events, the integrated risk profiles can be effective for designing safety systems to 
mitigate potential effects and risks of thermal radiation, overpressure and combustion products 
during fire and/or explosion events. Consideration of effects among thermal radiation, 
overpressure and combustion products in the transitional event modelling, makes the study 
unique and realistic in safety analysis of an LNG processing facility. The proposed 
methodology would be useful for the safety measure design of processing facilities and an 
effective emergency preparedness plan.
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Abstract
In a complex processing facility, there is likelihood of occurrence of cascading scenarios, i.e. 
hydrocarbon release, fire, explosion and dispersion of combustion products. The consequence 
of such scenarios, when combined, can be more severe than their individual impact. Hence, 
actual impact can be only represented by integration of above mentioned events. A novel 
methodology is proposed to model an evolving accident scenario during an incidental release 
of LNG in a complex processing facility. The methodology is applied to a case study 
considering transitional scenarios namely spill, pool formation and evaporation of LNG, 
dispersion of natural gas, and the consequent fire, explosion and dispersion of combustion 
products using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD). Probit functions are employed to 
analyze individual impacts and a ranking method is used to combine various impacts to identify 
risk during the transitional events. The results confirmed that in a large and complex facility, 
an LNG fire can transit to a vapor cloud explosion if the necessary conditions are met, i.e. the 
flammable range, ignition source with enough energy and congestion/confinement level. 
Therefore, the integrated consequences are more severe than those associated with the 
individual ones, and need to be properly assessed. This study would provide an insight for an 
effective analysis of potential consequences of an LNG spill in any LNG processing facility 
and it can be useful for the safety measured design of process facilities.
Keywords: LNG spill, accident transition, integrated consequence, CFD
21. Introduction
LNG is considered as a safe and environmentally-friendly fuel. Safe storage, processing, 
transportation and usage are mandatory requirements for any fuel and LNG continues to reveal 
a long track record of safety in all these areas (Yeo et al., 2016). However, in a complex 
processing facility such as a floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) (Baksh et al., 2016a, b),  an 
incidental release of LNG may not simply lead to an event with only its individual impact. 
There is likelihood of escalating a minor event into more damaging events. For instance, an 
accidental release of LNG in a production facility has the potential to pose several hazards such 
as fire, explosion, brittle fracture, asphyxiation and freeze burn/frostbite. A leakage of LNG 
may be a single minor event itself. However, due to instantaneous vaporisation, it is likely to 
cause several events such as a fireball, flash fire, Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE), and pool 
fire when the vapour is ignited. Escalation of the mentioned events to a storage facility, may 
lead to Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE). The entire sequence of events 
and their interactions during an LNG spill event in an FLNG processing facility is illustrated 
in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. LNG spill events (adapted from Ikealumba and Wu (2014) with some modifications).
Due to the potential of having several events during an unintended LNG spill, the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) commissioned a study and recommended to 
improve the state of knowledge surrounding the potential for cascading damage to LNG vessels 
3in the case of an incidental release of LNG (US Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
2007). The study of cascading damage issues has proven difficult primarily because these 
events require the analysis of the interaction of a series of complex physical phenomena such 
as LNG flow, heat transfer, fracture and damage. Petti et al. (2013) summarized the outcomes 
of the studies on cascading damage (Figueroa et al., 2011; Petti and Kalan, 2011; Petti et al., 
2011) which explored the cryogenic and fire thermal damage to an LNG ship during a large 
LNG cargo tank breach. 
In these studies (Figueroa et al., 2011; Petti and Kalan, 2011; Petti et al., 2011), impacts 
(pressure wave, shrapnel or projectile) from the explosion are not considered in the cascading 
damage analysis. Examples of evolving accident scenarios are reported in (Ouddai et al., 2012; 
Petrie and Großbritannien, 1988). The Piper Alpha tragedy in 1988 caused 165 deaths due to 
an explosion after the release of flammable material. In the accident, leakage of gas occurred, 
and the presence of an ignition source caused multiple events such as a fireball and jet fire, 
followed by VCEs. The sequence of events led to the total loss of the platform (Pate -Cornell, 
1993). In 2004, an LNG accident occurred in the Skikda LNG plant in Algeria resulting in 27 
casualties, 56 injuries and $900 million loss. During this multiple explosions occurred due to 
excessive pressure in an adjacent boiler (Ouddai et al., 2012). The BP’s Texas City refinery 
explosion in 2005 caused 15 deaths and 180 injuries due to hydrocarbon release and subsequent 
fire and explosion (Manca and Brambilla, 2012). The release resulted in a VCE followed by a 
pool fire (Broadribb, 2006). In 2010, the Macondo accident in the Gulf of Mexico occurred 
with a series of events such as blowout, dispersion of released hydrocarbons, explosion and 
fire (Deepwater Horizon Study Group (DHSG), 2011). The flame propagating from the 
explosion reached the flammable vapour dispersed over the platform and led to the fire at the 
source of release at the drilling floor. Major accidents that occurred in process facilities are 
well explained in (Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011; Al-shanini et al., 2014; Khan and Abbasi, 
1999). These accidents are mainly associated with fires, explosions and toxic product release. 
Most past studies regarding fire and explosion accidents were limited to individual fires or 
explosions or combustion products modelling and did not address evolving accident scenarios 
(Dadashzadeh et al., 2013a; Dadashzadeh et al., 2014; Gavelli et al., 2011; Kim and Salvesen, 
2002). For instance, Dadashzadeh et al. (2013a) modelled the dispersion of flammable gas 
integrated with explosion consequences of the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion using a Flame 
Acceleration Simulator (FLACS). Smoke and heat radiation released from the fire also affect 
human health and offshore structures; however, this impact was not addressed in the 
consequence analysis. Dadashzadeh et al. (2014) proposed a methodology for toxicity risk 
4assessment during an LNG fire and revealed that high risks are found at the process facility 
due to higher concentrations of combustion products and longer exposure time. However, the 
direct consequence of fire was not considered. Baalisampang et al. (2017a) and Baalisampang 
et al. (2017b) modelled the impact of a fire in a typical FLNG processing facility. Other 
potential events, their interactions, and consequences were not included by Baalisampang et al. 
(2017a).  Kim and Salvesen (2002) conducted a study on LNG vapour release, which was 
addressed as a possible VCE. However, a potential fire scenario was not considered. Another 
study by Koo et al. (2009) focused on pool fire modelling only and no consideration was given 
to a VCE or other possible interactions such as a jet fire. But in most cases, fire, explosion and 
combustion product release occur one after another or simultaneously resulting in integrated 
consequences (Baalisampang et al., 2018a; Baalisampang et al., 2018b). Reviews of past 
accidents (Al-shanini et al., 2014; Dadashzadeh et al., 2013a; Manca and Brambilla, 2012) and 
models (Al-shanini et al., 2014; Baksh et al., 2015; Kim and Salvesen, 2002; Koo et al., 2009) 
demonstrate a need to evaluate the entire accident sequence to mitigate the impact, to develop 
appropriate response methods and to prevent accidents by designing safety measures in the 
system. Combination of various accidental events is important as one event may lead to another 
and increases the overall consequences. To model entire impacts of a potential accident in a 
complex processing facility, it is essential to consider transitional event scenarios because in 
such modelling, entire causes and effects of a series of events are considered. In comparison to 
onshore processing facilities, offshore facilities are deemed more vulnerable to transitional 
events due to limited topside space and harsh environmental conditions (Baalisampang et al., 
2016). Some offshore accidents involving transitional events are given in Table 1. 
Table 1
Offshore fire and explosion accidents associated with multiple events
Accident name, year 
and geographical 
region
Event sequence Consequences References
Piper Alpha, 1988,
Europe North Sea
Release          Explosion
         Fire
165 fatalities, total 
loss
(Pate -
Cornell, 
1993)
High Island Pipeline,
1989, US GOM
Collision         Release       
Explosion          Fire
11 fatalities, 4 injuries 
and significant 
damage
(OPG, 
2010b)
Enchova Central, 1984,
America South East
Blowout         Fire          
Explosion
42 Fatalities, 19 
injuries and 
significant damages
(OPG, 
2010b)
5Lake Maracaibo, 1993,
America South East
Explosion         Fire 11 fatalities, 
significant damage
(OPG, 
2010b)
Ubit, 1995,
Africa West
Explosion          Fire
10 fatalities, 23 
injuries and severe 
damage
(OPG, 
2010b)
Petrobras P-36, 2001,
America South East
Explosion         Fire      
Capsizing 
11 fatalities, total loss (OPG, 2010b)
Bombay High North, 
2005, Asia South
Collision         Release          
Fire
12 fatalities, severe 
damage to the jacket
(OPG, 
2010b)
Deepwater Horizon, 
2010, GOM
Blowout          Release         
Fire          Explosion
11 people died, 17 
injuries and total loss
(Deepwater 
Horizon 
Study Group 
(DHSG), 
2011)
Black Elk, 2012,
GOM
Release          Fire       
Explosion
3 people died, 
pollutant spill
(BSEE, 
2013)
SOKAR platform, 
2014,
Caspian Sea
Explosion          Fire 12 people fell into the 
sea
(Fattakhova 
and 
Barakhnina, 
2015)
Abkatun Alfa platform,
2015, GOM
Explosion          Fire 7 people died, 45 
injuries
(Offshore 
Post-
Everything 
offshore 
energy, 
2015)
In fire and explosion accidents, a combined impact assessment is assumed to provide a 
more accurate consequence than individual one. In fire and explosion accidents, a damage 
potential (radius) can be increased if the impact of combustion products is considered 
(Dadashzadeh et al., 2014). During fire and explosion accidents, depending upon the types of 
burning materials and their combustion products, people are exposed to adverse health effects. 
For an integrated impact study, Khan and Amyotte (2004) proposed a methodology that 
incorporated fire, explosion and toxic release damage indices to evaluate the inherent safety of 
a facility based on inherent safety guidelines. Dadashzadeh et al. (2013b) proposed a new 
methodology for modelling an integrated consequence of fire and explosion using the Fire 
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) and FLACS and concluded that the risk of combined consequences 
is higher than each individual risk. But potential risk from combustion products during fire 
and/or explosion was not considered in the study. Niazi et al. (2018) proposed an integrated 
consequence modelling approach for fire and combustion products using risk based and grid-
6based approaches and claimed that the risk posed by thermal radiation is confined only to the 
lower deck. But the risk of exposure to combustion products was present in a larger area than 
that of the radiation, due to the influence of wind. Unlike previous studies (Dadashzadeh et al., 
2013b; Khan and Amyotte, 2004; Niazi et al., 2018), the current study proposes a risk-based 
approach to model an integrated impact of fire, explosion and combustion products during an 
accidental release of LNG in a typical FLNG processing facility.
2. Methodology
This study proposes a methodology that models an integrated impact of evolving accident 
scenarios such as release, pool fire, explosion events and dispersion of combustion products as 
illustrated in Fig. 2. Currently, several Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) softwares tools 
such as IMESAFR (Tatom et al., 2011), Riskcurves (GexCon, 2018b), EFFECTS (GexCon, 
2018a), Riskan (Lewis, 2005), HAMS-GPS (HAMSAGARS) and Phast and Safeti (DNV-GL, 
2018) are available for accident modelling. They are simpler and faster than most CFD tools. 
A majority of QRA software tools lacks the capability of considering complex effects of 
geometry and equipment in the simulation and cannot model evolving accident scenarios. But 
this study considers the effect of complex geometry and/or equipment and models cascading 
events and their impacts using the following five steps.
In step 1, LNG release scenario, pool formation, vaporisation and dispersion of LNG 
vapour are modelled using FLACS. These phenomena are simulated with careful consideration 
of plausible scenarios. 
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Fig. 2. Proposed methodology for modelling an integrated impact of transitional events to 
human during an LNG spill.
In step 2, the potential transitional phenomena are considered by attending to a series 
of events such as dispersion of LNG vapour, pool fire and VCE. The phenomenological 
changes to spilled LNG and vaporisation due to a culmination of atmospheric effects and 
thermal radiation are considered for assessing the occurrence of potential cascading events. 
The thermal load obtained from the pool fire is used as the source of ignition for the VCE. For 
transitional events to occur, some minimum conditions need to be fulfilled. For instance, a 
dispersion event can transit to pool fire only if the flammability condition is met. Similarly, a 
VCE occurs when pertinent conditions such as confinement, turbulence, ignition source, and 
flammable gas cloud are present (Atkinson et al., 2017; Center for Chemical Process Safety, 
1996). These pertinent conditions are considered as stimuli for the transitions (events) 
(Alzbutas, 2015). During a release, with the vaporisation and dispersion of LNG in air, only a 
8vapour concentration in the range of 5-15 vol.% will sustain the propagation of a flame upon 
ignition. The concentration of the vapour above the upper explosion limit may act as feed gas 
to the fire. However, if the dispersed vapours accumulate in nearby semi-confined or confined 
areas, the fire may transform to a VCE upon ignition. This may increase the severity of 
consequence in total. If the flammable gas release is not ignited immediately, a vapor plume 
will form which will drift and disperse by the ambient winds and/or natural ventilation. If the 
vapour is ignited, but does not explode, it will result in a flash fire, in which the gas cloud 
within the flammable range burns very rapidly. If the vapour is not isolated during this time, 
the flash fire may burn to yield a jet fire at the source of the release, under the condition that 
the concentration range is appropriate, and the leak is present. 
In step 3, the heat released from the pool fire is modelled as the potential ignition source 
to ignite the flammable gas accumulated at a position away from the pool fire location such 
that the fire did not consume the rich vapour cloud from this location. It was assumed that this 
location did not get direct fire flame and the presence of high thermal radiation from the fire 
resulted in an autoignition of the vapour or influenced other ignition sources to ignite. During 
a release of a flammable gas, if the ignition is delayed by 5-10 min, a VCE may be the outcome 
(Assael and Kakosimos, 2010; Soman and Sundararaj, 2012). For ignition to take place, the 
vapour cloud must be within the flammable range, while at the same time a source able to 
supply the required energy must be available (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010). To model a pool 
fire transiting to a VCE, thermal radiation and other parameters such as temperature and 
pressure development are extracted from the previous step. There are various models available 
for gas explosion modelling, like empirical, phenomenological and CFD (Lea and Ledin, 2002). 
According to Tam and Lee (1998), CFD codes are inherently more flexible than both empirical 
and phenomenological models and are applicable to all fields. Some commonly used CFD 
models for explosion simulations are EXSIM, FLACS and AutoReaGas (Lea and Ledin, 2002). 
FLACS developed by the Global Explosion Consultants (GexCon AS) has been used widely 
for the modelling of gas dispersion and explosion in onshore or offshore facilities (Hansen et 
al., 2005). In this study, FLACS is used to model the fire and explosion scenarios. 
In step 4, the consequences of fire, explosion and/or combustion product release are 
analysed individually using probit functions. The heat load obtained from the fire is used to 
assess the fire impact to assets and people. The probability of human impacts from the heat 
radiation is calculated by Eq. (2), considering the probit model given in Eq. (1).
Probit function (Pr) = c1 + c2ln D,                           (1) 
9The probability of injury or death ,                          (2)  (𝑃) = 𝐹𝑘12[1 + 𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝑃𝑟 ‒ 52 )]
where D is the thermal dose , c1 and c2 are probit coefficients, Fk is a clothes correction (𝑘𝑊𝑚2 )43𝑠
factor, and erf is the error function. The thermal dose is obtained from the post processing file 
using inbuilt utilities in FLACS.
Sudden large changes in pressure due to an explosion can lead to dramatic and possibly fatal 
damage to vital human organs such as lungs and ears. The impact of explosion is assessed 
based on the calculation of the probability (P) of injury or death employing Eqs. (3)-(8).
Probit function (Pr) = c1 + c2ln S,                           (3) 
The probability of injury or death (P)                                       (4)  = 12[1 + 𝑒𝑟𝑓(𝑃𝑟 ‒ 52 )],
where variable S is defined according to the type of the effect calculated by S =  ), (4.2𝑃 + 1.3𝑖
where is the scaled impulse , is scaled pressure (-) and c1 and c2 are probit 𝑖 (𝑃𝑎12.𝑠.𝑘𝑔 ‒ 13) 𝑃 
coefficients (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010). Explosion effects on humans are usually 
categorised as:
1. Direct or primary effects
The overpressure from the explosion can cause injury to sensitive human organs, or 
death.
2. Indirect effects
The indirect effects are sub-divided into two categories
a. Secondary effects refer to injuries or death caused by fragments or debris thrown 
by explosion's blast, 
b. Tertiary effects that refer to injuries or death caused by whole-body displacement 
and collision with stationary objects or structures, because of the explosion's blast 
waves.
The probabilities of impact to lung, eardrum rupture, head impact and whole-body 
displacement impact are calculated using Eq. (4). However, the Pr are different. In this study, 
the following probit functions are used for each type of impact (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010).
For lung damage, (5)𝑃𝑟 = 5 ‒ 5.74 ln𝑆
For eardrum damage, (6)𝑃𝑟 =‒ 12.6 + 1.524 ln𝑃𝑠
For head impact, (7)𝑃𝑟 = 5 ‒ 8.49 ln𝑆
For whole-body displacement, (8)𝑃𝑟 = 5 ‒ 2.44ln𝑆
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where Ps is overpressure (Pa). According to Clancey (1972) cited in Crowl and Louvar (2011) 
1-99% fatalities can occur when exposed to over 2 bar.
Toxicity of combustion products accounts for a major cause of death and injury from 
unwanted fires (Hartzell, 1992). The main combustion products are divided into two types: 
asphyxiant gases, which prevent oxygen uptake by cells, leading to loss of consciousness and 
death; irritant gases which cause immediate incapacitation affecting eyes and upper respiratory 
tract long-term damage in the lung (Hull and Stec, 2010). Because of these harmful effects, 
they can seriously jeopardise evacuation. During an LNG fire or VCE, carbon monoxide (CO) 
and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) are the main toxic combustion products (Dadashzadeh et al., 2014).
In the step 5, the integrated impact of fire, explosion and combustion product release is 
estimated. For integration of fire and VCE effects a grid-based approach is used such that 
consequence severity can be mapped as an index. To estimate risk of each event, a risk-based 
approach was further adopted using a severity index and probability of each effect. The severity 
index for each type of effect (Si) is estimated using expert judgment. The effects are ranked 
based on their severity of damages (Table 2) and experts' judgment on a scale of 1–10. 
Table 2
Severity scores for human effects caused by fire and explosion  (Dadashzadeh et al., 2013b)
Fire Explosion
Effects First 
degree 
burn
Second 
degree 
burn
Death Lung 
damage
Eardrum 
rupture 
(injury)
Head 
impact 
(death)
Whole body 
displacement 
(death)
Score (S) 2 5 10 10 5 10 10
The severity index for each effect at any location of the plant is calculated as follows:
Riski = Si × Pi,              (9)
Where, Riski denotes the severity index for each effect and i denotes the effects (first degree 
injury, second degree injury and death for fire; lung damage, eardrum rupture, head impact and 
whole-body displacement for explosion). At each grid point, the maximum severity index 
among the various effects of each accident is considered using Eqs. (10) and (11) for a fire and 
explosion respectively. 
Riskf = maximum [Risk First degree burn, Risk Second degree burn, Risk Death]                          (10)
Riske = maximum [Risk Lung, Risk Eardrum damage, Risk Head impact, Risk Whole body displacement]            (11)
The total risk of fire and VCE (Riskfe) at any location is estimated using Eq. (12),
Riskfe = Riskf + Riske               (12)
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Using the Riskfe at any location of the layout, risk contour can be obtained considering 
cumulative effects of a fire and VCE.
The toxicity risk assessment is carried out according to the methodology proposed by 
Dadashzadeh et al. (2014). A hazard index (HI) was estimated at each grid point of the layout 
using Eq. (13) (National Research Council, 1998).
(13)𝐻𝐼 = 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑚𝑔/𝑚3)𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑚𝑔/𝑚3)
For toxic risk estimation of each contaminant of the combustion product, Eq. (13) can be 
written as in Eq. (14). 
Riskcombustion product =                                (14)
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝐿𝑉 ‒ 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐿
Where TLV-STEL is the Threshold limit value - Short Term Exposure Limit (mg/m3). By 
adding the hazard quotients (hazard indices) for the individual emission toxicants, the hazard 
quotient of all toxicants is obtained as shown in Eq. (15). A risk of a health effect is assumed 
to exist at those exposure locations where the hazard index exceeds 1.
(15)𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐶𝑂 + 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑁𝑂2
Finally, the integrated risk at any location of the facility is estimated by investigating the Riskfe 
and the Riskcombustion products under any considered scenarios.
3. Application of the integrated methodology: a case study 
The proposed methodology is applied to a typical layout consisting of several process 
equipment as shown in Fig. 3. Leak, vaporisation and dispersion are strongly dependent on the 
operating parameters and may need to consider prevalent operating conditions. In this case 
study, prevalent operating conditions are considered based on FLACS user’s manual (GexCon 
AS, 2013). In this scenario, 10 kg/s of LNG is released at an LNG processing plant. According 
to Woodward (2010) the appropriate wind speed for flammable cloud dispersion is usually 
close to 2 to 4 m/s and thus, the wind speed is taken as 3 m/s with an ambient temperature of 
20°C. A pool of LNG is formed at the release location and vaporization occurs due to the 
ambient conditions. The vaporized LNG is then dispersed by the wind and a fuel vapour cloud 
is formed in the process area. At 125 s, an ignition occurs in the process area which leads to a 
pool fire. After 55 s the fire transits to a VCE in the congested and confined portion of the 
facility. This time is chosen based on the presence of the maximum thermal radiation in the 
layout. The heat load released due to the fire enhances the LNG vaporization over the LNG 
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pool and causes a VCE. A transitional scenario is developed considering the inherent 
characteristics of the LNG spill and various potential events (such as pool formation, spreading, 
vaporization, and vapour dispersion) are modelled.
Fig. 3. A layout chosen for the transitional events modelling
 3.1. Release, pool formation, vaporisation and dispersion modelling
In this scenario, an instantaneous release of LNG is considered which led to a pool 
formation and formed a flammable vapour plume upon vaporisation. A pool fire is considered 
with a delayed ignition. The entire layout 85 m × 55 m × 20 m is considered for simulation 
with a grid resolution of 0.4 m for the x and y directions and 0.3 m in the z direction. A 
sensitivity analysis was performed using volumetric concentration to select the grid size for a 
solution independent of the mesh size. Around the leak location, the grid resolution was 
adjusted to 0.2 m while at the locations far from the pool area, grids were stretched according 
to grid refinement guideline given in GexCon AS (2013). The LNG was assumed to be 
composed of 85% methane, 10% ethane and 5% propane. According to Pitblado et al. (2005) 
the maximum credible puncture hole is 250 mm. Thus, a point leak is considered from a 0.05 
m2 hole for 120 s forming a pool. A dynamic pool model (PM3) is chosen which means that 
the pool spreads with non-uniform pool temperature due to the influence of heat and mass 
transfer in each control volume (GexCon AS, 2013). A constant evaporation rate of 0.14 
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kg/(m2s) is considered based on the OPG (2010a). The considered leak parameters are given in 
Table 3.
Table 3
Leak parameters considered in the release scenario
Leak type Jet
Leak position (26.5, 20, 1.2) m
Leak direction +X
Start time 5 s
Duration 120 s
Outlet
a. Area
b. Mass flow rate
c. Relative turbulence intensity
d. Turbulence length scale
e. Temperature
0.05 m2
10 kg/s
0.02 (Low)
0.025 m
-160°C
The initial and boundary conditions assigned for the simulation are provided in Table 4 and 
Table 5 respectively. The Euler boundary condition is a zero pressure condition and demands 
significant distance in all directions (GexCon AS, 2013).
Table 4 
Initial conditions used
Parameters Values
Characteristic velocity 0.1 m/s
Relative turbulence intensity 0.1
Turbulence length scale 0.01 m
Temperature 20 °C
Ambient pressure 100 kPa
Ground roughness 0.001 m
Reference height 2 m
Pasquill stability class F
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Table 5 
Boundary conditions
Name Type
XLO Wind
XHI Euler
YLO Wind
YHI Euler
ZLO Euler
ZHI Euler
All parameters required for post processing are given in Table 6.
Table 6
 A list of simulated parameters
Output parameters Unit 
Pressure (P) barg
Maximum pressure (PMAX) barg
Velocity vector (VVEC) m/s
Combustion product mass fraction (PROD) -
Temperature (T) K
Mass fraction of carbon monoxide (CO) -
Radiative heat flux (QRAD) kW/m2
Total heat flux (Q) kW/m2
Mass fraction of soot (SOOT) -
Heat dose (QDOSE) ((kW/m2)^(4/3)s)
Mass fraction of Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) -
Probability of death (PDEATH) -
Toxic probit (PROBIT) -
Toxic concentration (TCONS) mg/m3
Toxic dose (TDOSE) mg/m3.minute
The vaporised fuel concentrations in the layout are monitored during the dispersion as shown 
in Figs. 4 and 5. The presence of flammable concentrations (0.05 - 0.15) indicates that the fuel 
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has the potential to be ignited in several areas of the layout. This would likely contribute to the 
occurrence of transitional events or evolving accident scenarios.
Fig. 4. Dispersion of vaporised LNG over the layout (m3/m3) at time 125 s
Fig. 5. 3D dispersion of fuel in the layout (m3/m3) at 125 s which shows the maximum volume 
of gas cloud.
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3.2. Assessing the possibility of transitional features
A VCE is considered as the final event and to identify transitional features, fire 
modelling is considered. Based on the dispersion characteristics of the LNG vapour, a pool fire 
is modelled with a delayed ignition 125 s using the FLACS fire model as demonstrated in Fig. 
6. In the fire simulation, the Discrete Transfer Method (DTM) model is used because this is the 
most accurate radiation model (GexCon AS, 2013). Emissivity of 0.85 is used because it is 
applicable to most steel surfaces. To provide numerical stability, radiation start ramp is 
considered to be 1 (GexCon AS, 2013). The Eddy Dissipation Concept (EDC) is chosen as the 
combustion model. The Formation Oxidation model is chosen as the soot model. For typical 
hydrocarbons, the soot yield is in the order of 1% (GexCon AS, 2013). Radiation, smoke and 
engulfment are the main hazards of a pool fire (Jagger and O’Sullivan, 2004). The possibility 
of ignition of the accumulated LNG vapour due to the thermal radiation release from the fire 
needs to be assessed for transitioning to a VCE.
Fig. 6. 3D pool fire model at 125 s
The main purpose of the transitional event modelling is to analyse if the fire or dispersed 
vapour can cause a VCE or flash fire in the presence of an existing fire. The most likely location 
of a VCE can be identified based on the presence of a flammable concentration of LNG vapour, 
confinement/equipment congestion and ignition source. An autoignition can be a source of 
ignition of the vapour or heated objects due to the thermal radiation from the fire (Planas-Cuchi 
et al., 1997; Zheng and Chen, 2011). According to the fuel concentration and its developed 
pressure during LNG vapour dispersion, a transition of the pool fire to a VCE is modelled. The 
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transition from fire to VCE is considered after 55 s of the start of the fire, that is at 180 s. The 
small pressure developed during LNG vapour dispersion is demonstrated in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. Pressure developed in in the layout during dispersion of the fuel (barg)
3.3. Toxic potency assessment of combustion products
During LNG (mainly methane) fire, CO, Carbon dioxide, NO2, unburnt methane and water are 
produced as combustion products depending on complete or incomplete combustion reaction. 
In this study, only CO and NO2 are considered for toxic potency assessment owing to their high 
toxicity  (Dadashzadeh et al., 2014). The different symptoms and health effects of CO and NO2 
are found in Purser et al. (2015) and the National Research Council (1998) respectively.
3.4. Integration of impact analysis
In this current study, an integrated impact analysis is conducted according to the step 5 of the 
methodology. The risks severity of combustion products was not directly normalised with those 
of thermal radiation and overpressure. However, an integrated impact analysis is conducted by 
investigating the risk contours of fire, VCE and combustion products. Similar to Dadashzadeh 
et al. (2013b), an integrated risk contour is used for assessing the impact of transitional accident 
scenarios in the facility. 
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4.Results and discussion
4.1. Results for transition modelling
The released LNG dispersed in the air resulted in a flammable vapour concentration 
over the plant not only adjacent to the leak location but also away from it. The autoignition 
temperature of LNG (primarily methane) is 1004ᵒF (813.15K) (Foss et al., 2003). High 
temperatures and radiation from the fire reach the congested/confined areas, indicating that 
during the fire, there is a possibility of transitioning the fire into a VCE. The range of radiation 
and temperature generated during the fire are given in Figs. 8 and 9 respectively. 
Fig. 8. Temperature distribution over the layout during the pool fire (K) at 180 s
The maximum temperatures and thermal radiation are 2300K and 80 kW/m2 
respectively. These high temperature and thermal radiation may easily contribute in causing 
other fires in adjacent areas. The variation of air pressure in the layout in the presence of the 
dispersed vapour can be a useful information for assessing the potential location of a VCE. 
During gases dispersion, concentration in the air can create different initial pressure, which is 
one of the parameters on which the strength of explosion depends (Kundu et al., 2016). In this 
study, the maximum pressure developed during the dispersion of LNG vapour is 0.001 barg 
(illustrated in Fig. 7). The 1 mbar initial pressure may not have a substantial effect on the 
strength of a VCE. The output results obtained from the fire modelling and the dispersion 
modelling show that the transition to a VCE or a flash fire is possible.
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Fig. 9. Radiation from the fire over the layout (kW/m2) at 180 s
4.2.  Thermal radiation impact
The tenability limit for human beings is approximately 2.5 kW/m2 (Mannan, 2012). The 
presence of thermal radiation greater than 2.5 kW/m2 indicates that the fire can have serious 
effects to human and adjacent assets. The probability of injuries (first and second-degree burn) 
and the probability of death at different location of the plant are calculated using the thermal 
radiation. The maximum damage distance for various effects of fire is given in Table 7. 
Table 7
Maximum damage distance for various effects of fire
Effects on humans Heat flux (kW/m2) Maximum damage 
distance (m)
100% lethality in 1 min.
1% lethality in 10 s
37.5 26.2
100% lethality in 1 min.  Serious 
injuries in 10 s
25 33.5
1% lethality in 1 min.
First degree burns in 10 s
12 36.7
No lethality.
2nd degree burns probable.
4 39.8
20
Pain after exposure of 20 s.
Acceptable limit for prolonged 
exposure
1.6 43.5
The fire risk index of all grid points was calculated and plotted over the layout as demonstrated 
in Fig. 10. The risk index (Riskfe) varies from 1 to the maximum value of 10 at the flame surface.
Fig. 10. Fire risk contour in the layout at 180 s
4.3.  VCE impact and risk assessment
The impact of the VCE and its subsequent risk are assessed based on the overpressure 
developed during the VCE. The explosion overpressure ranges from 0 to 2 barg over the layout 
and high pressures are found in the areas with a high congestion/confinement level as shown 
in Fig. 11. The developed pressures are limited within a portion of the congested layout. 
However, the developed pressures can result in damages to assets and humans in those areas 
of the facility. The damage distance from the VCE ignition point is illustrated in Table 8.
Table 8 
Damage distance from the VCE ignition point
Effects Distance from the 
ignition point (m)
100% fatality 4.60 
60% fatality 6.25
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Fatal distance limit 7.80
Eardrum damage limit 10.30
Safe distance 15 
Fig. 11. VCE pressure over the plant (barg) at 180 s
Using the probit model, the probabilities of injuries or death caused by the overpressure 
were estimated. Subsequently, the VCE risk index (Riske) was calculated and plotted over the 
facility as shown in Fig. 12. The values of the VCE risk index vary from 1 to 10. Index 1 
corresponds to very low risk and the index 10 shows the maximum risk. A high-risk index is 
found in the congested/confined areas and vice-versa. 
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Fig. 12. Explosion risk profile at 180 s
4.4.  Combustion product impact
The toxic concentration (mg/m3) data obtained from the fire and explosion simulations were 
used for the toxicity assessment.  The concentrations of contaminants are high near the fire and 
explosion locations and confined areas. The toxic concentration of NO2 is given in Fig. 13. In 
confined areas, the concentration of NO2 is more than 105 mg/m3. Carbon monoxide is very 
toxic and a concentration of 1.28% leads to death within 2-3 minutes (Struttmann et al., 1998). 
The toxic concentration of CO is illustrated in Fig. 14. The higher concentrations of NO2 are 
present in larger areas of the layout than those of CO. The obtained NO2 and CO values are 
relatively high because these concentrations were measured when there was ongoing fire. Risk 
values are high around the fire and VCE locations due to higher concentrations of contaminants. 
This is because a risk value directly depends on exposure duration and concentration. 
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Fig. 13. Concentration of NO2 over the layout (mg/m3) at 180 s
Fig. 14. Toxic concentration of CO (mg/m3) at 180 s
4.5.  Integrated impact during transition of fire to VCE
In most fire and/or explosion events, injury or fatality can be caused by combustion 
products in addition to radiation or overpressure hazards. Fig. 15 demonstrates the integrated 
risk contours in the layout because of thermal radiation and overpressure during the fire and 
VCE. For simplicity, the range of risk index is normalised between 1 and 10 in the integrated 
risk profile. High risk indices are available in the fire location and the VCE area due to the 
inherent nature of those events. 
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Fig. 15. Integrated risk profile of the fire and the VCE at 180 s
In toxicity risk assessment, an integrated risk of both contaminants is considered as 
shown in Fig. 16. The total combustion product risk shows that significant portions of the 
facility exceed the acceptable level of risk which is 1. The integrated risk profile of 
contaminants indicates that the high-risk area is larger than that of the integrated impact of fire 
and VCE as seen in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. However, due to the short exposure duration, the 
severity of the combustion products is lower than that of thermal radiation and overpressure. 
This shows that the impact of transitional events such as fire and VCE along with combustion 
products is more severe than an individual phenomenon because more portions of the facility 
exceeded the acceptable level of risk.
The current approach incorporates an additional feature to the previous integrated 
consequence studies such as Khan and Amyotte (2004) and Dadashzadeh et al. (2013b).  Khan 
and Amyotte (2004) incorporated fire, explosion and toxic release damage indices, but did not 
directly assess the consequence. The adopted technique in Khan and Amyotte (2004) cannot 
be useful for visualizing the area directly affected by fire, explosion and combustion products. 
The severity of consequence would have been different if the impact of the combustion product 
was considered by Dadashzadeh et al. (2013b). During a fire and/or explosion, the potential 
risk from combustion products can be too simple to ignore because toxicity has been a major 
cause of death and injury from fires (Hartzell, 1992).
 This paper illustrated only a specific case study. However, any changes in operating 
conditions such as wind speed, wind direction, snow, rain or other parameters can be 
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incorporated in this approach. Therefore, a range of scenarios can be envisaged and evaluated 
accordingly.
Fig. 16. Integrated risk of combustion products at 180 s
5. Conclusions
In Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) processing facilities, there is a possibility of a fire 
transitioning into a Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) or vice-versa during an accidental release 
of hydrocarbons as demonstrated in various past fire and explosion accidents. Identification of 
potential location of transitional events is useful for understanding the occurrence of cascading 
accident scenarios. A framework has been proposed for modelling transitional events (fire, 
VCE and combustion product release) and their integrated consequences using Computational 
Fluid Dynamics (CFD). The proposed framework was applied to a case study considering an 
accidental LNG release, including vaporisation, a pool fire and a VCE. The impact of each 
individual event was assessed, and an integrated consequence was modelled using a risk-based 
approach. The severity of risk during each event in the layout was compared. By analysing the 
LNG spill, vaporisation, dispersion and subsequent fire in the layout, it is foreseeable that a 
pool fire can transit to a VCE because of the availability of required suitable conditions such 
as a flammable vapour concentration, ignition source and congestion/confinement. The risk of 
the overpressure was limited to confined spaces and was insignificant in other areas. The risk 
of thermal radiation was present in a larger area in comparison to the VCE. The risk of 
combustion products was present in a larger area than those of radiation and the overpressure, 
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but its severity was lower due to the short exposure duration. It was found that the integrated 
risk of transitional events was higher than that of the individual risk. 
A change in weather conditions and source terms may affect the outcome of an analysis 
related to gas leak and dispersion. Responses to gas leak and its dispersion are strongly 
dependent on these parameters and one set of parameters may not represent all cases. For 
illustration purpose, this study has presented only a specific case. Once operating conditions 
such as wind speed, wind direction, snow, rain or other parameter changes, the response need 
to be evaluated accordingly. The current study serves to highlight the importance of transitional 
events modelling and expands the scope of the integrated consequence modelling approach. 
Despite having complex correlations among various parameters involved in LNG spill and 
subsequent events, the integrated risk profiles can be effective for designing safety systems to 
mitigate potential effects and risks of thermal radiation, overpressure and combustion products 
during fire and/or explosion events. Consideration of effects among thermal radiation, 
overpressure and combustion products in the transitional event modelling, makes the study 
unique and realistic in safety analysis of an LNG processing facility.
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